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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 950687-CA

BRET THOMAS CRIDDLE,

Priority No. 2 (incarcerated)

Defendant/Appellant

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-a-3(2)(f) provides this Court's
jurisdiction over this case from a court of record involving a
second degree felony conviction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err in denying trial counsel's motion
for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the State's
case?
In reviewing this issue, the Court must determine whether
the State provided u'believable evidence of all of the elements
of the crime charged.'" See State v. Emmett, 83 9 P.2d 781, 784
(Utah 1992)(citation omitted).

Mr. Criddle will marshal the

evidence sustaining the charge in the State's case-in-chief, and
demonstrate why the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law.
See State v. Mincv, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah App.
1992)(discussing the marshaling requirement), cert, denied, 843
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
This issue was properly preserved by Mr. Steele's motion for
a directed verdict at the close of the State's case-in-chief (R.
353-355).

2. Does Mr. Criddle's incompetency at the time he stood
trial require a new trial?
Since this issue was not raised below, this Court must
determine whether evidence of Mr. Criddle's incompetency arose
during the proceedings, requiring the trial court to initiate
competency proceedings.
38 (Utah 1989).

See State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1235-

See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2.

This Court

may resort to the ineffective assistance of counsel and/or plain
error doctrines in addressing the merits of this issue.
3. Does the trial court's failure to recuse herself
require a new trial?
Since this issue was not raised below, this Court must apply
standards set forth in State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah
1988), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1220 (1988), and determine whether
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 was complied with, whether
there is a showing of actual prejudice, and whether there was an
abuse of discretion. The Court may resort to the plain error
doctrine in addressing the merits of this issue.
4.

Must the trial court hold a restitution hearing?

In assessing the legality of the restitution order, the
Court should apply the standards of review set forth in State v.
Garcia, 866 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1993), as follow:
Generally, "[u]nless a trial court exceeds the
authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion,
we will not disturb its order of restitution."
However, whether or not restitution is proper in this
vcase depends solely upon interpretation of the
governing statute, and the "trial court's
interpretation of a statute presents a question of
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law." "We accord a lower court's statutory
interpretations no particular deference but assess them
for correctness, as we do any other conclusion of law."
State v. Garcia, 866 P.2d 5, 6 (Utah App. 1993)(citations
omitted).
This issue was preserved when Mr. Steele raised restitution
issues before the trial court (R. 312-313), and when Mr. Fratto
also raised restitution issues before the trial court (R. 225226) .
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes, rules and constitutional provisions
are central to this appeal, and are copied in full in Addendum
to this brief:
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12
United States Constitution, Amendment VI
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 1
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-1
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-3
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-4
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 23
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 2 9
Utah Rule of Evidence 201.
STATEMENT OF CASE
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
The State charged Mr. Criddle and Jonathan P. Remington by
information signed on May 27, 1994, with one count of theft, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404;
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and with one count of Criminal Mischief, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (R. 7-8).
The court appointed Mr. Robert Steele of the Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association to represent Mr. Criddle (R. 23). After the
preliminary hearing on February 15, 1995, Judge Burton ordered
Mr. Criddle bound over as charged (R. 1 ) .
The State moved to dismiss the criminal mischief count prior
to trial (R. 312).
Judge Stirba presided over the case in district court, and
at the district court arraignment on February 27, 1995, Mr.
Criddle pled not guilty (R. 38).
At the close of the State's case, Mr. Steele moved for a
directed verdict because the State's evidence proved nothing more
than Mr. Criddle's mere presence at the scene of the theft of the
trailer (R. 353). Judge Stirba denied the motion for a directed
verdict, finding that the jury could reasonably infer that when
Mr. Criddle was present at the scene of the trailer theft, he was
directing the truck driven by the co-defendant to hook up with
the trailer (R. 354) .
Judge Stirba rejected numerous defense instructions
indicating that mere presence is not enough to justify a
conviction (R. 365, 67, 84, 85, 86). The revised instruction she
required read as follows:
The mere presence of the defendant at the scene of
the crime may not be sufficient evidence of his guilt.
You may, however, infer his guilt from this fact and
others presented at trial. In order to find the
defendant guilty you must find, beyond a reasonable
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doubt, that the defendant, having the appropriate
mental state, acted in violation of the provisions of
the law rather than merely being present or acquiescing
in conduct or circumstances that might otherwise
constitute a violation of the law.
(R. 168).
The jury convicted Mr. Criddle as charged, of theft (R.
178) .
Judge Stirba ordered a ninety day diagnostic evaluation
prior to sentencing (R. 185). She also ordered that Dr. Linda
Gummow evaluate Mr. Criddle, apparently at Mr. Steele's request
(R. 191).
On August 17, 1995, Mr. Steele withdrew from representing
Mr. Criddle because a conflict of interest had arisen (R. 192,
194).

Judge Stirba appointed Joseph Fratto Jr. and Kevin

Kurumada to represent Mr. Criddle (R. 114).
At the sentencing on September 18, 1995, Judge Stirba
ordered Mr. Criddle to serve a prison term of one to fifteen
years, concurrently with the sentence imposed by Judge Brian (R.
197).

She also fined Mr. Criddle $2,500, plus an 85% surcharge.
Judge Stirba ordered Mr. Criddle to pay restitution in the

amount of $4,745, jointly and severally with Mr. Criddle's codefendant (R. 197). Prior to trial, Mr. Steele had argued that
no restitution should be imposed because the restitution all
flowed from the criminal mischief count, which was dismissed
prior to trial on the State's motion (R. 312). Judge Stirba had
indicated that she would address the matter later, but never did
(R. 313).
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Assuming that restitution could properly be awarded for
damage done to the trailer and its contents, the trailer owner,
Lester Gayheart, testified that the maximum damage done was
$3,000 (R. 326).
The total amount recommended in the presentence report was
$4,652.87 (presentence report at 15), but the figures in the
presentence report which supposedly itemize the restitution order
total up to $3,930.87 (presentence report at 5 ) . More
importantly, the list of restitution items in the presentence
report in Judge Stirba's case is identical to the list of figures
in a separate case before Judge Brian involving a different
victim, Steven Howe (presentence report at 5 ) .
Mr. Fratto argued at the sentencing hearing that there were
questions as to the proper amount of restitution to be awarded
(R. 225-27), but Judge Stirba ordered Mr. Criddle to pay
$4,745.00 (R. 228).
Judge Stirba indicated that Mr. Criddle could have a
restitution hearing before the Board of Pardons if there was a
conflict about what he owed (R. 228).
During the course of proceedings, Mr. Criddle sent numerous
letters to various court personnel in this case, which reflect
his incompetency to stand trial, and are included in the addendum
to this brief.

Some of these letters were filed in a file

separate from the pleadings file in the district court, and were
transferred to this Court upon the motion of Mr. Anderson, under
seal by Judge Stirba.
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The day after sentencing Mr. Criddle, on September 19, 1995,
Judge Stirba wrote to the chairman of the board of pardons, as
follows:
Dear Mr. Sibbett,
This letter is written regarding Bret Criddle who
I sentenced yesterday to one to 15 years for second
degree felony theft. Last week, Judge Pat Brian
sentenced Mr. Criddle to the Utah State Prison for
similar offenses.
I am aware that prior to his being sentenced by
Judge Brian, Mr. Criddle made verbal and written
threats to Judge Brian. In one of Mr. Criddle's several
letters to me, Mr. Criddle made threatening comments
towards me as well.
Moreover, during sentencing, Mr. Criddle shouted
at the Court, necessitating the transportation official
to take Mr. Criddle's arm in an effort to calm him.
Further, on his way back to the holding cell from the
courtroom, Mr. Criddle spat on my door. In addition to
his poor conduct, I am concerned about Mr. Criddle's
"personalization" of the Court. For example, he
addressed me as "Anne" in two letters to the Court; and
in his letters generally, he seemed overly personal
towards the Court.
Based on the information about Mr. Criddle
contained in the presentence report, the 90-day
diagnostic evaluation, and his conduct before Judge
Brian and me, in my opinion, Mr. Criddle is a very
angry, unpredictable, unstable, explosive and
potentially dangerous individual.
I have never before requested that I be contacted
prior to an inmate's release. However, I am doing so
in this case because I believe Mr, Criddle is capable
of coming back against the Court at some future time.
Thus, I formally request that you notify me prior to
any release of Bret Criddle, be it to a halfway house,
on parole or at the expiration of his terms.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely yours,
Ann M. Stirba
District Court Judge
(R. 199). x
On October 10, 1995, Judge Stirba again wrote to Mr.

A copy of the letter appears in the addendum to this brief.
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Sibbett, stating,
Enclosed for your information and consideration is
a copy of a letter I received from Bret Criddle last
week. As I stated in my previous letter to the Board,
on September 19, 1995, I believe Mr. Criddle has
somewhat focused on me as at least one of the causes of
his problems. His persistent anger about my role as
judge in this case and his tendency to refer to me by
my name in his salutation continues to be of concern to
me.
Again, I request that I be notified prior to any
release of him, be it to a halfway house, on parole or
at the expiration of his term.
Thank you for your consideration of this letter.2
Patrick L. Anderson filed the notice of appeal on Mr.
Criddle's behalf (R. 201).
FACTS OF THE CASE
At trial, the State established that Lester Gayheart owned a
trailer and contents that were valued between $4,000 and $5,000,
and were taken without his authorization from a condominium
carport in Salt Lake County on or about April 21, 1994(R. 320326) .
Matthew Schultz saw Mr. Criddle's co-defendant, Jonathan
Remington, driving a truck near the carport prior to hitching the
truck to the trailer, and also saw Mr. Criddle standing silently
and motionless near the trailer and the truck (R. 328-339).
The foregoing evidence was the essence of the State's casein-chief .
In Mr. Criddle's defense case, Mr. Criddle testified that on

2

A copy of this letter appears in the addendum to this brief.
It bears no numerical stamp from the district court because it
was transferred to this Court in a sealed envelope from Judge
Stirba.
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April 22, 1995, Mr. Remington came over and asked if Mr. Criddle
wanted to get drunk, and they shared a bottle of vodka (R. 3 693 70).

Mr. Remington told Mr. Criddle he needed to get some

money, so they got in Mr. Remington's truck and drove to an
apartment complex (R. 370). After Mr. Remington exited the truck
and went into an apartment complex, he came back to the truck and
drove over to some trailers (R. 371). Mr. Remington retrieved
from a trailer a leather jacket that Mr. Criddle had seen him
wear on two prior occasions (R. 371). Mr. Remington mentioned
that he was glad to have the jacket back and that they were going
to take the trailer (R. 371). Mr. Criddle did not participate in
hitching the trailer to the truck in any way, inasmuch as he was
wearing nice clothes (R. 371). Mr. Remington then had a
conversation with Mr. Schultz, who happened by with a lawnmower
(R. 3 72).

As Mr. Remington began pulling out, the trailer hit

the carport, and Mr. Remington drove off angrily and in a hurry
(R. 3 72-373).

Mr. Remington drove recklessly away and eventually

detached the trailer by some storage sheds (R. 373). Mr. Criddle
did not dare to get out while this was going on, for fear that
Mr. Remington would think that Mr. Criddle had reported him in
the event that Mr. Remington were arrested (R. 3 73).

They later

went out drinking at a bar, where Mr. Remington was bragging
about having heisted a trailer (R. 374). This bothered Mr.
Criddle, because he thought that the trailer was Mr. Remington's
(R. 374).
Mr. Remington stayed the night at Mr. Criddle's apartment at
9

Mr. Remington's invitation (R. 375). The next day, Mr. Remington
saw a trailer in Mr. Criddle's apartment complex and suggested
that they should take it (R. 375). They went and looked at the
trailer, and it had four or five tags on it indicating that it
should be removed from the parking lot, or would be towed (R.
376).

Mr. Criddle told Remington that it might have been

abandoned, and that he would ask his apartment manager about it
and see if they could have it (R. 3 77).

Mr. Criddle and Mr.

Remington, and another friend, Joseph Brollier, were later
driving out of the apartment complex, to go to a bar, when Mr.
Remington drove up to and hitched on the trailer with Mr.
Brollier's assistance (R. 377-378).

Mr. Criddle was shocked, and

sat in the truck, not knowing what to do (R. 378). Mr. Remington
drove off and went to a Midas Muffler shop, where they cut the
lock off the trailer (R. 379). Mr. Brollier sold a sprayer out
of the trailer to an employee at Midas for $5 (R. 3 90).

When Mr.

Remington drove off again, the trailer jack was still down (R.
3 79) . He drove for a distance, causing damage to the trailer,
and he and Mr. Criddle and Mr. Brollier were eventually
apprehended by the police (R. 379-380).

Mr. Criddle testified

that he was convicted of theft of that trailer (R. 3 81).
Detective Ben Jones testified that he interviewed Mr.
Remington, Mr. Brollier, and Mr. Criddle after the recovery of
the second trailer on April 23, 1995 (R. 391). Remington was
aggressive and abusive and invoked his right to an attorney (R.
3 92).

Mr. Criddle was very cooperative, as was Mr. Brollier, who
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told the police officer the same version of events as did Mr.
Criddle (R. 393-394).
The facts they conveyed to him were similar to those Mr.
Criddle testified to at trial in this case (R. 395-397).
However, Officer Jones did indicate that all three men hooked up
the trailer, and that at the Midas shop, as far as he knew, Mr.
Criddle participated with the other two men in telling the Midas
employees that the trailer belonged to someone's ex-wife (R. 3963 98).

His police report also indicated that it was Mr. Criddle

who suggested that the sprayer be sold for five dollars, and
participated in the plan to steal the trailer, indicating that he
was going to ask the manager if they could have it (R. 397-399) .
Jones testified that Mr. Criddle indicated that he knew the
second trailer was stolen (R. 400). All three men were extremely
intoxicated (R. 401).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse Mr. Griddle's conviction and order
the case dismissed because the State failed to present a prima
facie

case in its case-in-chief.

Mr. Criddle's mere presence at

the scene of the theft did not establish his guilt of the theft
as a matter of law.
Mr. Criddle's letters and behavior in court demonstrate that
he was not competent to stand trial.

In the event that this

Court does not order the case dismissed, the Court should order a
new trial, which may occur only after Mr. Criddle's competency is
fully evaluated and established.
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In the event that the Court does not order the case
dismissed, a new trial is also required before a different judge
because Judge Stirba should have recused herself from this case
because she felt personally threatened by Mr. Criddle.
In the event that this Court does not order the case
dismissed, this Court should remand the case for a restitution
hearing.

The restitution order imposed by the Court is

inconsistent with the law, with the evidence presented in court,
and with the presentence report (which is inconsistent with
itself on the issue of restitution).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
IN THE STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF.

A. FACTS
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Mr. Steele moved
for a directed verdict because the State had proved nothing more
than Mr. Criddle's mere presence at the scene of the trailer
theft (R. 123). Judge Stirba denied the motion, stating,
I think there is sufficient evidence for the case
to go forward. I think it is a jury question. There
is evidence, as Mr. Postma has argued, that the
defendant was seen standing between the trailer and
truck. And there can be a reasonable inference drawn,
or an inference drawn which is not unreasonable, that
the purpose of his standing there was to guide the
truck to back up and pull the trailer away.
Given the time frames and his proximity to this
and the evidence about Mr. Remington as well, I
respectfully deny the motion for a directed verdict.
(R. 354-55).
Judge Stirba refused to give the jury the instructions
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submitted by Mr. Steele indicating that mere presence is not
enough to justify a conviction (R. 365, 67, 84, 85, 86), but
instructed the jury instead that
The mere presence of the defendant at the scene of
the crime may not be sufficient evidence of his guilt.
You may, however, infer his guilt from this fact and
others presented at trial. In order to find the
defendant guilty you must find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant, having the appropriate
mental state, acted in violation of the provisions of
the law rather than merely being present or acquiescing
in conduct or circumstances that might otherwise
constitute a violation of the law.
(R. 168). 3
Assuming that the marshaling requirement applies in this
context, see State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah App.
1992)(discussing the marshaling requirement), cert. denied, 843
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992), marshaling the evidence leads to the
conclusion that the evidence in the State's case-in-chief should
have resulted in a directed verdict of acquittal.
In the State's case-in-chief, the State called four
witnesses: Lester Gayheart, Matthew R. Schultz, Arthur D.
Lindquist, and Robert Hall.
Lester Gayheart owned the trailer and contents, and
testified that he did not authorize anyone to remove it from the
carport (R. 320-326).

He was not acquainted with Mr. Criddle,

and did not witness the theft of the trailer (R. 324-325).
Matthew R. Schultz did maintenance work at the condominiums

Copies of the requested and revised instructions are in the
addendum to this brief.
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from which the trailer was stolen (R. 328-329).

On April 21,

1994, Mr. Schultz saw John Remington driving a pick-up truck and
backing the truck toward the trailer (R. 330). He saw Mr.
Criddle standing between the truck and trailer as the trailer was
backing up (R. 330-331).

His description of Mr. Criddle's

activities was as follows:
Q
Let me back up a little bit. Tell me where
the defendant was standing and what he was doing as you
saw this truck backing up.
A
He was standing between the truck and the
trailer. I was only there for a few minutes. He
wasn't doing much. He was just standing there at the
time.
(R. 331). Mr. Schultz said that the truck and the trailer were
three feet apart, and that Mr. Criddle was between them (R. 332).
Mr. Schultz did not know if Mr. Criddle was directly behind the
truck (R. 332).
Mr. Schultz first said he could not recall if the truck was
moving when Schultz happened by, but did recall that Mr.
Remington had just gotten out of the truck and began talking to
Schultz (R. 333, 338). He later testified that he did not see
the truck moving (R. 337). Mr. Schultz testified that while he
and Mr. Remington were talking with one another, Mr. Criddle
stayed ten feet away from them (R. 338).
Mr. Schultz did not see the truck move, or see anyone hook
up the trailer (R. 339). When defense counsel stated, "He may
have been lining up the truck but you didn't see him make any
motion?" Mr. Schultz responded, "No.
there." (R. 339).
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I just saw him standing

Mr. Schultz picked Mr. Remington and Mr. Criddle from a
photo array (R. 335-336).
He never testified that he saw Mr. Criddle and Mr. Remington
communicate with one another in any way.4
Arthur D. Lindquist did not witness the theft, but testified
about damage to the carport (R. 34 0-343).

He had not seen Mr.

Criddle at the condominiums from which the trailer was stolen (R.
344) .
Robert Hall was the police officer who conducted the photo
array with Mr. Schultz (R. 346-351).
From the marshaling of the evidence, above, the Court can
see that the State proved nothing more than Mr. Criddle's mere
presence at the scene of the theft.

He was seen standing between

the truck and trailer when the truck was not moving, and was not
seen doing anything with the trailer, the truck or the truck's
driver.

According to the State's evidence, Mr. Criddle was less

involved in the theft of the trailer than was the State's
witness, Matthew Schultz, who was not only present at the scene
of the theft, but also spoke with the person driving the truck
who eventually took the trailer.
B. LAW
It is well established that one's mere presence at the scene
of a crime does not give rise to a permissible inference of
criminal activity.

Mere presence at the scene of a crime does

4

A copy of the transcript pages containing Mr. Schultz's
testimony is in the addendum to this brief.
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not give rise to probable cause,5 or even to a reasonable
suspicion.6

Mere presence at the scene of a crime cannot be the

basis of a criminal conviction, even on the theory of accomplice
liability.7
The jury instructions submitted by Mr. Steele were
consistent with the foregoing law (R. 67, 84, 85, 86), while the
revised instruction given by the court incorrectly implied that a
conviction might rest solely on the basis of Mr. Criddle's
presence at the scene of the crime.8
5

See e.g. State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah 1986)(no
probable cause to search person in the presence of others for
whom there is probable cause to search, or on premises where
there is probable cause to search).
6

See e.g. State v. Svkes, 840 P.2d 825, 828 (Utah App.
1992)(summarizing cases demonstrating that one's mere proximity
to criminal activity does not give rise to a reasonable inference
that one is a participant in the criminal activity); State v.
Munsen, 821 P.2d 13, 15-16 (Utah App. 1991)(same), cert.
denied,843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
7

See e.g. State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App.
1991)(presence of person in car with illegal drugs does not
support conviction for possession of drugs); State v. Kerekes,
622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980)("An accomplice, as defined by s
76-2-202, is one who is also criminally liable for the conduct
charged. Mere presence, or even prior knowledge, does not make
one an accomplice when he neither advises, instigates,
encourages, or assists in perpetration of the crime.")(citations,
footnote omitted); State v. Fertig, 233 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah
1951)("Mere presence combined with knowledge that a crime is
about to be committed or a mental approbation while the will
contributes nothing to the doing of the act, will not of itself
constitute one an accomplice.").
8

The revised instruction read,
The mere presence of the defendant at the scene of
the crime may not be sufficient evidence of his guilt.
You may, however, infer his guilt from this fact and
others presented at trial. In order to find the
defendant guilty you must find, beyond a reasonable
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Because the State's evidence in its case-in-chief
established nothing more than that Mr. Criddle was seen standing
near the scene of the trailer theft, and failed to establish
participation or even communication with Mr. Remington, who was
driving the truck that was apparently approaching the trailer,
the trial court should have granted the motion for a directed
verdict of acquittal.
II.

See e.g. Fertig,

supra.

A NEW TRIAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE MR. CRIDDLE WAS TRIED
WHILE HE WAS INCOMPETENT.

A. THE LAW
Due process of law forbids the trial of an incompetent
defendant, and requires trial courts to hold competency
proceedings if evidence of incompetence arises during the course
of proceedings.
(Utah 1989).

E.g. State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1235-38

See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-1("No person who is

incompetent to proceed shall be tried or punished for a public
offense.").
Incompetency is defined by Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2, which
provides,
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is
incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental
disorder or mental retardation resulting either in:
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual
understanding of the proceedings against him or of the

doubt, that the defendant, having the appropriate
mental state, acted in violation of the provisions of
the law rather than merely being present or acquiescing
in conduct or circumstances that might otherwise
constitute a violation of the law.
(R. 168)(Emphasis added).
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punishment specified for the offense charged; or
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and
to participate in the proceedings against him with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 further illuminates factors to be
considered in the competency equation.

It sets forth criteria

for competency examiners to consider and address in reporting to
the courts in competency proceedings, stating,

(4) The experts shall in the conduct of their
examination and in their report to the court consider
and address, in addition to any other factors
determined to be relevant by the experts:
(a) the defendant's present capacity to:
(i) comprehend and appreciate the
charges or allegations against him;
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent
facts, events, and states of mind;
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the
range and nature of possible penalties, if
applicable, that may be imposed in the
proceedings against him;
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal
strategies and options;
(v) understand the adversary nature of
the proceedings against him;
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom
behavior; and
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable;
(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or
mental retardation, if any, on the nature and
quality of the defendant's relationship with
counsel;
(c) if psychoactive medication is currently
being administered:
(i) whether the medication is necessary
to maintain the defendant's competency; and
(ii) the effect of the medication, if
any, on the defendant's demeanor and affect
and ability to participate in the
proceedings.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-3 allows for the filing of competency
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petitions by the defendant, by anyone representing the defendant,
by anyone having custody of or supervision over the defendant, or
by the prosecutors.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-4 allows a trial

court to raise the issue of competency at any time.
B. THE FACTS
Mr. Criddle's conduct in court, his progression of letters
to the judge and other judicial and political figures, and the
psychological evaluation in Mr. Criddle's 90 day diagnostic
report demonstrate that Mr. Criddle should not have been tried
because he was incompetent.

As discussed below, his paranoid

schizotypal mental disorder left him unable to rationally
understand the most fundamental rudiments of the criminal
process, to make rational choices, or to conduct himself
appropriately in the courtroom.
1.

Mr. Criddle's Behavior In Court Demonstrates His
Incompetency.

As Judge Stirba's first letter to the board of pardons
demonstrates, Mr. Criddle's behavior in court was inappropriate.
The threat to Judge Brian referred to in Judge Stirba's letter
involved Mr. Criddle pantomiming shooting himself in the head and
then pointing to Judge Brian in open court in a case that was
being prosecuted at approximately the same time as the instant
case (R. 32, 34 in this Court's case number 950639-CA, in the
addendum).9

Mr. Criddle provides these pages of the record from
Judge Brian's court in his addendum in seeking judicial notice of
the record by this Court.
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Mr. Criddle also behaved strangely in Judge Stirba's court.
For instance, prior to Mr. Criddle's testimony, Judge Stirba
warned Mr. Criddle that his testimony would likely lead to the
introduction of damaging evidence related to his other conviction
for a theft of a trailer which occurred the day after the events
at issue in the instant case.

Mr. Criddle stated, "Yeah, yeah.

It will only help me." (R. 368).
At the sentencing hearing before Judge Stirba, as Judge
Stirba's letter to the board of pardons reflects, Mr. Criddle
repeatedly interrupted Judge Stirba (R. 227), and apparently spat
on her door on his way out of the courtroom (R. 199, in
addendum).

When Judge Stirba asked Mr. Criddle if he would like

the opportunity to make a statement in court, Mr. Criddle stated,
Yes, I would. As I have stated in most of my
letters and as I stated in trial, I didn't commit a
crime. That's just a fact. Someone came to my
apartment and picked me up and took me out for a ride.
I didn't think they were committing a crime at the
time. And I would have assisted them but I wasn't
capable of it. The person would not allow me the
capability to do anything. I sat there with idle hands
while he performed the entire action.
I was convicted by a jury of people that I
recognize from the first neighborhood that I lived in

Particularly because Judge Stirba was aware of and
influenced by Mr. Criddle's conduct in Judge Brian's court, it
appears appropriate for this Court to take judicial notice of the
record of proceedings in that court. Compare Utah Rule of
Evidence 201 (requiring Courts to take judicial notice of facts
"not subject to reasonable dispute" "if requested by a party and
supplied with the necessary information" at "any stage of the
proceeding."), with Mel Trimble v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758
P.2d 451, 455-56 (Utah App.)(mandatory judicial notice is
applicable only to trial courts, that appellate courts have
discretion to decline to take judicial notice), cert. denied, 769
P.2d 819 (Utah 1988).
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in Salt Lake City. And I believe those people were
prejudiced against me by a person who I was a roommate
with there who we have had bad relations since then. I
don't think that any Court would be right that would
commit me to do any time whatsoever in this situation.
I didn't commit a crime. And I cannot believe that you
or this court would be in the right to commit me to do
any more time, even one more day. Thank you.
(R. 224).
Mr. Griddle's inappropriate behavior in court reflects Mr.
Criddle's failure to have a rationale understanding of the
proceedings against him, and his inability to participate in the
proceedings in a rational or reasonable understanding.
Code Ann. § 77-15-2, supra,
2.

See Utah

(defining incompetency).

Mr. Criddle's Written Correspondence Demonstrate his
Incompetency.

All of Mr. Criddle's available correspondence is included in
the addendum to this brief.
In addition to the letters he wrote to Judge Stirba, during
the course of proceedings, Mr. Criddle also attempted to enlist
the assistance of Judge Fuchs (R. 21-22), Judge Peuler (R. 200),
Judge Hanson (R. 213-215), and all government employees (R. 216)
in obtaining relief from various perceived injustices.
The letter he wrote to Judge Stirba prior to sentencing
while he was at the diagnostic unit exemplifies how Mr. Criddle's
correspondence with the court reflects his failure to appreciate
the nature of the proceedings, and failure to participate in the
proceedings with a rational degree of understanding.

It states,

DEAR ANNE,
YOUR HONOR. THIS IS BRET CRIDDLE. HERE AT THE
DIAGNOSTIC UNIT THEY BELIEVE I'M SANE. BUT I DON'T! I
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CAN'T POSSIBLY BE SANE TO EVEN BE HERE! I DIDN'T
COMMIT A CRIME! NO WAY NO HOW! THE POLICE FAILED TO
COME UP WITH THE TRANSCRIPTS BEFORE THE TRAIL BECAUSE
THEY STATE I DIDN'T DO IT! MY PUBLIC DEFENDER DIDN'T
DO HIS JOB I DON'T BELIEVE HE EVER DOES. FRANKLY HE
KNEW IF I WAS FOUND NOT GUILTY I WOULD HAVE GROUNDS TO
SUE THE STATE AND HE DID HALF OF THE COUNTYS' WORK FOR
THEM! NOW I WANT OUT! THIS IS IMMORAL, UNETHICAL, AND
I BELIEVE ILLEGAL! I HAVE GIVEN EVERYONE INVOLVED,
INCLUDING YOU, THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT IN BELIEVING
YOU WOULDN'T ALLOW PROBABLY THE MOST CRUEL THING THAT
CAN BE DONE TO MAN OR BEAST TO HAPPEN. I WANT
RETRIBUTION, RESTITUTION, AND RESTORATION IMMEDIATELY.
I BELIEVE THAT THE SOONER YOU SEE YOUR WAY CLEAR
TO MAKING THE SITUATION RIGHT WHENEVER YOU CAN THE
BETTER YOUR WORLD WILL BE. I AM NOT A CRIMINAL. I AM
NOT A VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL AND I DID NOT COMMIT A CRIME.
I WAS A VICTIM AND I WAS TAKEN FOR A RIDE AND YOU HAVE
ONLY TAKEN ME FOR ANOTHER.
I AM A VERY GOOD INDIVIDUAL AND SOMEONE WILL
EVENTUALLY NOTICE I HAVE BEEN WRONGED.
PLEASE FOR EVERYONE'S SAKE MAKE THE SYSTEM OF
CHECKS AND BALANCES WORK. IT'S TIME TO BE FAIR.
I DO BELIEVE YOU KNOW I DID NOT COMMIT A CRIME. I
DON'T PARTICULARLY CARE WHAT REASONS OR RATIONAL WAS
AND WERE USED TO COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WOULD BE
EXCEPTABLE TO LOCK UP A GOOD, FREE, INDIVIDUAL,
MYSELF!, BUT THEY MUST HAVE COME FROM THE COMPLETELY
NEGATIVE SIDE OF REALITY.
I WANT WHAT'S HAPPENED TO ME "REPAIRED" AND I WANT
IT DONE IMMEDIATELY. I GUARENTE YOU ARE TAMPERING WITH
THE WRONG SIDE OF POWER AND RELIGION. YOU ARE
UNLICENSED BY ME AND TO DO THIS TO ME OR ANYTHING LIKE
ME IS "NATURALY ILLEGAL."
YOU BETTER HUMBLE YOURSELF AND FIND OUT HOW FAR
GONE YOU REALLY ARE. I AM A GOOD PERSON AND THE
MAJORITY OF PEOPLE EFFECTED BY ME GET BETTER. I AM NOT
A PROBLEM. THIS ENTIRE SITUATION HAS GONE WAY, WAY,
TOO FAR. YOU WILL BE MAKING ONE OF THE BIGEST MISTAKES
OF YOUR LIFE TO LET IT CONTINUE.
REMEDY THE SITUATION OR BE SICK WITH IT FOREVER!
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR RECONSIDERATION
SINCERELY,
BRET CRIDDLE
Mr. Criddle prepared two highly detailed and rambling
nineteen page responses to the presentence report - one in
handwriting and one typed.

The responses contain numerous highly
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inappropriate comments and do not lend themselves to summary, but
should be read by the Court.
Anyone who was familiar with Mr. Criddle's correspondence
with the court, particularly officers of the court, should have
investigated Mr. Criddle's competency prior to trial and prior to
sentencing.
3.

The 90 Day Diagnostic Report Demonstrates Mr. Criddle's
Incompetency.

The diagnostic report submitted for Mr. Criddle's sentencing
diagnoses Mr. Criddle with "alcohol abuse, adult antisocial
behavior, and schizotypal personality disorder with paranoid
features."

Diagnostic report at 2.

In discussing Mr. Criddle's

behavioral characteristics, the report states,
He is impulsive, self-indulgent, egocentric, immature
and irritable. He is often tense and overreacts to
even minor sources of stress. Mr. Criddle tends to be
suspicious, obsessional, moody, and exhibits a sense of
grandiosity. His judgment is poor and he has
difficulty expressing emotions without overreacting or
over controlling. Mr. Criddle has the potential to act
out his conflicts in a physical aggressive manner. He
is uninhibited in risk taking, has a high energy level,
and a strong need for stimulation and excitement.
Furthermore, he engages in rationalization and blames
others for his difficulties.
Diagnostic report at 3.
These diagnoses dovetail with Mr. Criddle's behavior in
court and correspondence and demonstrate that Mr. Criddle was
suffering from a "mental disorder" resulting in "his inability to
have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings
against him" and "his inability to ... participate in the
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational
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understanding."
C.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2.

This Court Should Order A New Trial.

As previously noted, due process requires trial courts to
initiate competency proceedings whenever evidence of a
defendant's incompetency to proceed arises.

E.g. State v. Young,

supra.
As discussed above, the record in this case is replete with
evidence of Mr. Criddle's incompetency.

Mr. Criddle's behavior

in court and in writing constitutes evidence of his incompetence,
which triggered the trial court's duty to initiate full
competency proceedings under Utah and federal law.

Young, supra.

Even if evidence of Mr. Criddle's incompetency did not arise
until after the trial, the trial court should have instigated
competency proceedings under Young, and trial counsel should have
moved to arrest judgment under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
23, which provides,
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence,
the court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion
of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense,
or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other
good cause for the arrest of judgment.
Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless a
judgment of acquittal of the offense charged is entered
or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the
defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any
other order as may be just and proper under the
circumstances.
Under this rule, arrest of judgment is the appropriate step to
take when the court or parties realize after judgment but prior
to sentence that the defendant was incompetent.
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See State v.

Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 594-95 (Utah 1988).
It appears that Mr. Criddle's conviction must be reversed
under Young, despite the fact that neither trial counsel raised
the issue of Mr. Griddle's incompetency because the law placed
the duty squarely on the shoulders of the trial court to
institute competency proceedings when evidence of competency
arises.

Id.

In the event that this Court must, the Court may resort
again to the doctrines of plain error and ineffective assistance
of counsel in correcting the due process violation stemming from
the trial of Mr. Criddle while he was incompetent.

See State v.

Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989)(discussing plain error and
ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines).
The need to address Mr. Criddle's incompetency should have
been plain to both the trial court and trial counsel.

Both the

trial court and trial counsel performed in an objectively
deficient manner in failing to address the competency issue.
There is a reasonable probability of a different result in the
absence of the error, for Mr. Criddle may not have been tried and
convicted at all, had the proper competency proceedings been
followed.

See Verde,

supra.

III. THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO RECUSE HERSELF
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 governs recusal of
judges, and provides,
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other
disability, the judge before whom a trial has begun is
25

unable to continue with the trial, any other judge of
that court or any judge assigned by the presiding
officer of the Judicial Council, upon certifying that
he has familiarized himself with the record of the
trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed with
and finish the trial, but if the assigned judge is
satisfied that neither he nor another substitute judge
can proceed with the trial, he may, in his discretion,
grant a new trial.
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other
disability, the judge before whom a defendant has been
tried is unable to perform the duties required of the
court after a verdict of guilty, any other judge of
that court or any judge assigned by the presiding
officer of the Judicial Council may perform those
duties.
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in any
criminal action or proceeding files an affidavit that
the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be
tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against
the party or his attorney or in favor of any opposing
party to the suit, the judge shall proceed no further
until the challenge is disposed of. Every affidavit
shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief
that the bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed as
soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or
the bias or prejudice is known. No affidavit may be
filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of
record that the affidavit and application are made in
good faith.
(d) If the challenged judge questions the
sufficiency of the allegation of disqualification, he
shall enter an order directing that a copy be forthwith
certified to another named judge of the same court or
of a court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then
pass upon the legal sufficiency of the allegations. If
the challenged judge does not question the legal
sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom
the affidavit is certified finds that it is legally
sufficient, another judge shall be called to try the
case or to conduct the proceeding. If the judge to whom
the affidavit is certified does not find the affidavit
to be legally sufficient, he shall enter a finding to
that effect and the challenged judge shall proceed with
the case or proceeding.
(e) (I) If the prosecution or a defendant in a
criminal action believes that a fair and impartial
trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the
action is pending, either may, by motion, supported by
an affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have the trial
of the case transferred to another jurisdiction.
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(ii) If the court is satisfied that the
representations made in the affidavit are true and
justify transfer of the case, the court shall enter an
order for the removal of the case to the court of
another jurisdiction free from the objection and all
records pertaining to the case shall be transferred
forthwith to the court in the other county. If the
court is not satisfied that the representations so made
justify transfer of the case, the court shall either
enter an order denying the transfer or order a formal
hearing in court to resolve the matter and receive
further evidence with respect to the alleged prejudice.
(f) When a change of judge or place of trial is
ordered all documents of record concerning the case
shall be transferred without delay to the judge who
shall hear the case.
Under well established Utah law, a trial judge has a duty to
recuse herself if her impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, even in cases where no actual bias is shown.

State

v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 1091, 1093-95 (Utah 1988), cert, denied, 487
U.S. 1220 (1988); State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 911 (Utah App.
1990), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990); State v.
Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925-26 (Utah App. 1990).

Under this law,

reversal is required if Rule 29 is not complied with, if there is
a showing of an abuse of discretion, or a showing of actual bias.
Id.
A judge is biased if he has ua hostile feeling or spirit of
ill will toward one of the litigants, or undue friendship or
favoritism toward one," or has "some active personal hostility
toward the defendant."

Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523

(Utah 1948)(citations omitted). See also Black7s Law
Dictionary,{"Actual bias

consists in the existence of a state of

mind on the part of the juror which satisfies the court, in the
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exercise of a sound discretion, that the juror cannot try the
issues impartially and without prejudice to the substantial
rights of the party challenging.").
In the instant case, Judge Stirba was actually biased
against Mr. Criddle.

Her letters to the board of pardons, in the

addendum, demonstrate that Judge Stirba felt personally
threatened by Mr. Criddle.

Regardless of whether Mr. Criddle's

actions, statements and letters were properly interpreted as
threats, the fact that Judge Stirba felt personally threatened by
Mr. Criddle demonstrates actual bias.

E.g. Haslam,

supra.

Under rule 29 and Utah case law, Judge Stirba should have
recused himself because she was actually biased, and her failure
to do so constitutes an abuse of discretion and reversible error.
See e.g. Neeley; Haslam, supra. Compare Kleinert v. Kimball
Elevator Co., 905 P.2d 297 (Utah App. 1993)(declining to address
recusal issue raised for first time on appeal), cert. denied, 913
P.2d 749 (Utah 1996), with Regional Sales Agency v. Reichert, 830
P.2d 252 (Utah 1992)(majority indicates that recusal is trial
court's responsibility, not counsel's).
It appears that Judge Stirba's fear of Mr. Criddle was not
voiced until after sentencing, when she wrote twice to the board
of pardons.

Thus, trial counsel had no opportunity to raise the

issue concerning her disqualification to act on the case.

While

trial counsel did not raise the judge's partiality, the plain
error doctrine provides a means of addressing the error on
appeal. See e.g. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah
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1989)(discussing showings which must be made under plain error
doctrine).

Given Judge Stirba's personal fear of Mr. Criddle,

the need for Judge Stirba's recusal should have been obvious to
her.
Given the relative weakness of the State's case against Mr.
Criddle, the relatively non-serious nature of the facts proved
against Mr. Criddle, and the fact that the sentencing matrix in
Mr. Criddle's case recommended probation (presentence report,
form 3 ) , there is a reasonable probability that the results in
this case, both the verdict and ultimate sentence, would have
been different had Judge Stirba recused herself.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT MUST HOLD A RESTITUTION HEARING.

A. FACTS
Judge Stirba ordered Mr. Criddle to pay restitution in the
amount of $4,745, jointly and severally with Mr. Criddlefs codefendant (R. 197).
Prior to trial, Mr. Steele had argued that no restitution
should be imposed because the restitution all flowed from the
criminal mischief count, which was dismissed prior to trial on
the State's motion (R. 312). 10

Judge Stirba had indicated that

10

See State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App.
1993)("Restitution should be ordered only in cases where
liability is clear as a matter of law and where commission of the
crime clearly establishes causality of the injury or damages."),
cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201 (authorizing damages for special damages recoverable in a
civil action based on the crime of conviction or other activities
for which the defendant accepts responsibility); Utah Code Ann. §
77-18-1 (same).
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she would address the matter later, but never did (R. 313).
Mr. Fratto argued at the sentencing hearing that there were
questions as to the proper amount of restitution to be awarded
(R. 325-327).
Judge Stirba ordered Mr. Criddle to pay $4,74 5.00.

The

total amount recommended in the presentence report was $4,652.87
(presentence report at 15), but the figures in the presentence
report which supposedly itemize the restitution order total up to
$3,930.87 (presentence report at 5).

The trailer owner, Lester

Gayheart, testified that the maximum damage done was $3,000 (R.
326).

The presentence report listed figures from Steven Howe,

the victim in Judge Brian's case (Presentence Report at 5).
Judge Stirba indicated that Mr. Criddle could have a
restitution hearing before the Board of Pardons if there was a
conflict about what he owed (R. 228).
B. LAW
The primary error of the trial court was her refusal to
afford Mr. Criddle a full hearing on the restitution issues, and
her assumption that the matter could be relegated to the Board of
Pardons.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 expressly requires trial

courts to hold full restitution hearings at the time of
sentencing if restitution is in dispute.

It states in subsection

(4) (e) ,
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition,
amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court
shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a
full hearing on the issue.
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This Court has recognized that by virtue of section 76-3201, criminal defendants are entitled to full restitution
hearings, wherein they may present witnesses, and cross-examine
witnesses for the State, upon request.

State v. Starnes, 841

P.2d 712, 715 (Utah App. 1992).
Inasmuch as the presentence report in Judge Stirba's case
plainly and erroneously included the restitution information
pertinent to Judge Brian's case and victim, Steven Howe
(presentence report at 5), Judge Stirba had no basis in the
report for her restitution order.

Particularly where the total

of the itemized list in the presentence report ($3,930.87
(presentence report at 5)) was different from the total amount of
restitution requested in the presentence report ($4,652.87
(presentence report at 15)), and where both of those figures were
different from the figure describing the maximum damage at trial
($3,000 (R. 326)), the judge should have recognized the need for
a hearing, rather than ordering Mr. Criddle to pay an amount
different from all of the foregoing figures ($4,745.00, R. 327).
Particularly given the issues raised by Mr. Steele
concerning whether any restitution can be ordered in light of the
State's dismissal of the criminal mischief charge, which Judge
Stirba agreed to address (R. 312, 313), and given Mr. Fratto's
again raising unspecified concerns about the accuracy of the
restitution recommended in the presentence report (R. 325-327),
Judge Stirba should have held a hearing.
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Starnes.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Mr. Griddle's conviction and order
the case dismissed.

In the alternative, the Court should order a

new trial and a restitution hearing before a new judge, to
proceed only after Mr. Criddle's competency is evaluated and
established.
Dated this

G?

day of September, 1996

Patrick L. Anderson
Attorney for Mr. Criddle
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